Azerbaijan has taken a firm and principled stance, expressing its position at the highest levels. President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly emphasized what our country expects from Russia: an apology, acknowledgment of responsibility, a transparent investigation, accountability for those responsible, and compensation for the families of the deceased and injured passengers.
It was to be expected that Azerbaijan’s resolute position would not sit well with many in Moscow, as well as the emergence of an information campaign against Azerbaijan, where insults and crude rhetoric are employed in lieu of substantive arguments. Among those contributing to this disreputable effort are journalist Anna Sochina, political analyst Vladimir Karasev (whom the Russian Public Chamber is now attempting to distance itself from), and “independent expert” Nikolai Platoshkin.
Many in both Moscow and Baku are quick to attribute such actions to the influence of the Armenian lobby. This narrative, while convenient, not only shifts focus away from Russian authorities but also concentrates blame on the Armenian diaspora. However, this explanation does not align with reality—just as it did not in the late 1980s, early 1990s, or later. It is unlikely that the Pskov Airborne Division’s presence in Lachin or the display of “Iskander” missiles at a parade in Yerevan resulted from the efforts of Armenian lobbyists.
First and foremost, Russia is a country with a rigid vertical power structure, where ethnic lobbying, including by Armenians, is generally not influential. In fact, Armenian lobbying has been significantly weakening globally, as evidenced by the high-profile corruption trial of one of the leading Armenian lobbyists in the United States, Bob Menendez. Most importantly, Russia tightly controls its information landscape. Figures like Anna Sochina, Nikolai Platoshkin, and Vladimir Karasev do not act independently or make offhanded remarks without clearance. They certainly do not gain access to major platforms without permission.
Reports occasionally surface in the press, especially in opposition and independent outlets, detailing how authorities “manage” Russia’s talkative class through directives, meticulous oversight, and instructions on who to criticize, praise, invite to studios, or mention sparingly. This control extends beyond official media to influential bloggers, particularly the so-called Z-bloggers and “military correspondents.”
All the current aggressive statements targeting countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, or the United States are made exclusively under Kremlin directives. While such rhetoric may temporarily benefit Armenia and be portrayed to certain audiences as the work of the “Armenian lobby,” it is, in reality, part of the Kremlin’s broader information warfare strategy.
Let us not harbor illusions or create excuses for those who, instead of responding to the Aktau tragedy with compassion, a commitment to investigating the circumstances, and holding those responsible accountable, have launched a dirty information war against our country.
