Thus, the information has now been officially confirmed: Russia has terminated the criminal investigation into the crash of the AZAL aircraft that was struck by Russian air defense systems while approaching Grozny exactly one year ago, on December 25, 2024.
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated that the letter from the head of Russia’s Investigative Committee, Alexander Bastrykin, announcing the closure of the case caused serious surprise in Baku. The expert community, meanwhile, is trying to understand how such a decision became possible, what motivated it, and what real rationale lies behind it.
Yet it appears that Moscow was not pursuing any coherent or well-thought-out “benefit,” even one grounded in cynical pragmatism. Rather, the decision seems to have been driven by wounded great-power pride — an imperial reflex of sorts: how could it be acceptable for Russian officers to be held accountable at Azerbaijan’s insistence?
As a result of this supposed “wise policy,” the Kremlin is now creating serious problems for itself. This decision certainly does nothing to improve air safety — including for Russian citizens themselves. If yesterday an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft could be struck by Russian air defense missiles with no one held responsible, tomorrow the same could happen to a Russian airliner or to an aircraft belonging to any other country. However, the most severe consequences lie in the political domain. With Azerbaijan, such scenarios do not work and, moreover, inevitably provoke a response. Relations between Baku and Moscow are already going through a difficult phase, and the termination of the criminal case over the downed aircraft threatens to push them to an even lower point.
At the same time, the closure of the case in Russia in no way limits Azerbaijan’s right to conduct its own investigation, including the possibility of issuing international warrants. There are also international mechanisms and institutions. Azerbaijan has already involved ICAO in the investigation, refusing to cooperate with the Interstate Aviation Committee on this matter. After Moscow effectively undermined the agreements reached in Dushanbe and discontinued the investigation, Azerbaijan may, if necessary, turn to other international bodies as well.
Against the backdrop of the long shadow cast by the investigation into the MH17 tragedy, the reputational and political consequences for the Kremlin are easy to imagine. Especially since, in the case of MH17, which was shot down over Ukraine’s Donbas, there was at least room for debate about responsibility. Here, there is no such ambiguity: the area around Grozny could not have hosted any air defense systems other than Russian ones. References to “drones of the Kyiv regime” sound like fairy tales suitable for a kindergarten audience.
Finally, Azerbaijan’s response may extend far beyond the aviation sector. Arguments along the lines of “Russia is big, Azerbaijan is small” do not apply here. What matters is political will and the ability to calculate moves accurately. And there is ample evidence that President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, first, acts on the basis of his country’s core national interests rather than a desire for external applause, and second, conducts policy at the level of a grandmaster.
In the end, behavior driven by imperial “phantom pains” proves extremely costly in the modern world — especially when it is applied to a country like Azerbaijan.
