Official Yerevan insists on signing a peace agreement during the COP29 conference, while simultaneously boycotting it and lobbying an anti-Azerbaijani agenda. Baku, for understandable reasons, rejects Yerevan’s terms, as they contradict common sense. President Ilham Aliyev has stated that it is “completely unrealistic” to expect a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia if it only includes provisions that do not provoke disagreements.
In an interview with the Azerbaijani website Minval.az, former Foreign Minister Tofig Zulfugarov shared his perspective on the complex situation that has emerged in the South Caucasus.
— How do you see the prospect of achieving a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia in terms of timing, format, etc.? What should Baku do to prevent Yerevan from speculating and instead support the demands regarding the OSCE Minsk Group and amendments to Armenia’s constitution?
— First of all, we are not talking about a comprehensive peace agreement, but about a framework agreement that outlines the parameters of the negotiation process and the conflict settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This framework document includes fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter. During negotiations, the Azerbaijani side repeatedly raised the issue of securing elements that guarantee the irreversibility of the peace process.
Guarantees of irreversibility are a crucial component because the essence of this conflict was Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan, the occupation of part of its territories, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Therefore, even seemingly logical demands, such as the abolition of the OSCE Minsk Group or its removal from Armenia’s legal field due to its outdated mandate, have not been fulfilled. Armenia’s actions essentially serve to legally fixate its territorial claims against Azerbaijan.
There are also numerous issues related to Armenia’s political responsibility, which Azerbaijan has repeatedly pointed out — specifically the political responsibility of certain individuals and elites in Armenia for igniting a conflict that claimed the lives of not only Azerbaijanis but tens of thousands of Armenians as well. We must understand that this armed aggression is essentially a constitutionally enshrined goal of the Armenian state. The aggression wasn’t just military, but also economic, legal, and ideological. Therefore, eliminating all remnants of this aggression is a logical political process that will lay the foundation for the future peaceful coexistence of the two states and their path to a new level of regional cooperation.
But what do we see? Armenia openly refuses to meet the demands regarding its constitution and the Minsk Group, makes contradictory statements, and there is no political condemnation or accountability for those who fueled this conflict. Moreover, revanchist slogans continue to be heard in Armenia, with territorial claims against Azerbaijan still being made. Given all of this, I believe that the negotiation process is currently at a serious impasse. This is why the President of Azerbaijan has rightly stated multiple times that we need to understand what Armenia really wants.
— It seems Armenia will continue to stall the process and arm itself further. Is there a way out of this situation? Would it be more appropriate to proceed without a formal agreement?
— First of all, we must understand that Azerbaijan opposes any imitation of a peace process. Armenia needs this imitation to mislead the international community and evade political and criminal responsibility for its aggression, the war it waged against Azerbaijan, and the damage it inflicted on our country — moral, material, and political. Therefore, the prospects for a peace process are quite dim.
Azerbaijan, along with those closely following the situation in the region, can clearly see that many external actors are interested in maintaining the conflict in one form or another, using it as a tool for regional control. These factors strain Azerbaijan and compel its leadership and public to ask: What exactly is Armenia aiming for in this political process?
So, in response to your question about Armenia’s calls for signing an unclear document ahead of COP29 to gain some PR and present itself as seeking peace and regional cooperation — while simultaneously refusing to unblock communications and grant the Zangezur Corridor that should connect the two parts of Azerbaijan — we are reviewing what is really happening.
The issue isn’t about COP29 but about creating the conditions to move the process in the right direction. The ball is in Armenia’s court, or rather in the hands of its political elite. They must decide what future they want. Do they want to continue the confrontation?
— On the other hand, this uncertainty works in Armenia’s favor, and it seems likely they will try to prolong the situation as long as possible to gain more from it.
— It may benefit the revanchist forces. However, from the standpoint of state or national interests, I don’t think they are interested in this. They are forced to spend their limited resources looking for sponsors to support their revanchist agenda and on an arms race, once again becoming a tool in someone else’s hands. For 30 years, they were a tool in the hands of Russia, and now they are searching for new sponsors to continue the conflict in the region and create problems for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and other regional countries.
— What is the fate of the Zangezur Corridor? How can the disagreements be resolved?
— Azerbaijan needs the Zangezur Corridor for a well-known reason. The historical injustice committed against Azerbaijan involved the Bolsheviks handing Zangezur to the Armenians, dividing the country into two parts. While this division wasn’t as apparent during the Soviet era due to communications and economic ties, it has now become a serious issue for Azerbaijan because our country is divided. This problem was addressed in the tripartite declaration of November 10, 2020, and Armenia committed to ensuring the connection between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, initially under the control of Russian border troops. Essentially, this was to be a peacekeeping operation on Armenian territory. We know that Russian border guards under the FSB controlled this part of the territory. Azerbaijan rightly assumed that the Armenians would not provide unhindered movement or security for our citizens, which is why this task was temporarily assigned to Russian border guards, and Armenia has been avoiding resolving this issue.
Now, there seems to be some progress, although we have repeatedly heard conflicting statements from Armenia. We’ll see how the situation develops. We must proceed from the fact that Azerbaijan has a strategic goal of ensuring safe, extraterritorial communication between the two parts of its country.
— Relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union have noticeably deteriorated since we restored our territorial integrity. What do you attribute this to, and how will the EU behave after a peace agreement is signed?
— I believe that since Brexit, it has become obvious that the French political elite dominates the EU. France sees its main task as blocking the growing economic and political influence of Turkey in the Mediterranean, and one of the tools for doing this is to stoke the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey is involved in this conflict, and it’s hard to say how long the EU will remain hostage to the post-colonial ambitions of the French political elite. However, I am confident that there are many sensible forces within the EU that will not follow the French neo-colonial political agenda. This situation directly impacts our relations with Armenia. Essentially, France does not believe that signing any document will end this conflict. They understand that even after the signing, they will begin to revive the “Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians” issue. We are already seeing political activities in this direction, meaning that French tactics and strategy dominate European structures.
— Some experts claim that the era of the EU is coming to an end amid significant disagreements, economic downturns, and political stagnation within the union, and that BRICS is rising. Do you agree with this, and what is Azerbaijan’s role in this geopolitical landscape?
— The EU crisis became particularly evident during Brexit when the UK no longer saw its future within the EU. Those who argue there is no crisis within the EU should direct their arguments to the politicians who executed Brexit. As for BRICS, this organization has yet to fully demonstrate its potential, making it difficult to predict future competition. However, Azerbaijan pursues a diversified foreign policy, and in this context, relations with BRICS are developing. We should avoid premature forecasts, but I agree that there are crisis phenomena within the EU, and expectations from BRICS do exist.
— The European Parliament frequently issues anti-Azerbaijani statements, including calls to cease cooperation with Azerbaijan. Is Baku responding appropriately to these challenges?
— Many in our society have moved past the illusions we had during perestroika or immediately after the Soviet Union’s collapse, believing that European institutions and media were so democratic that they would make fair decisions. All decisions are made along party lines, and members of parliament are selected from among the political elites of various countries, often former bureaucrats who continue their political careers either within the European Commission or the European Parliament after stepping down. I have observed these processes in the Baltic countries, so I have no illusions. As for the anti-Azerbaijani trend, it is set by France. Of course, work should be done against this, but we shouldn’t expect it to drastically change their position. The European Parliament should not be taken too seriously — it is a factory for producing declarations and statements that support the political line formed by the executive structures. They are simply earning their high salaries.
— 60 U.S. congressmen have urged the government to impose new sanctions against Azerbaijan. The President pointed out that this letter was drafted within the U.S. State Department and accused the U.S. of bias and double standards. Will these sanctions be imposed, and what will that mean for us? What steps should Baku take if they are?
— This is a form of pressure being prepared by the U.S. administration, fulfilling promises made by Armenian diaspora representatives in support of the Democratic Party. For example, Kamala Harris, a presidential candidate, made an absurd congratulatory remark, wishing U.S. Armenians a happy Armenian Independence Day. What was that? Where’s the logic? Why would you congratulate U.S. citizens, even if they are Armenians, on Armenian Independence Day? It doesn’t make sense to me. But there will be more such absurd moves to show pro-Armenian political forces. However, these actions elicit nothing but disrespect.
The Democratic administration, even during election campaigns, acts illogically concerning the interests of the state it seeks to lead. Everyone understands that the U.S. has many interests in the South Caucasus, including in Azerbaijan. Their behavior is reducing the U.S.’s opportunities in Azerbaijan, but the administration is willing to do this to secure votes. Understand, it’s not Western politicians who are against us, but certain factions within the administrations of France and the U.S. This doesn’t mean it will always be this way. We should view this as a political move, and I don’t consider the West an enemy or intend to draw dividing lines.
— Relations with Iran seem to have normalized, but there are questions about Tehran’s silence regarding the EU mission in Armenia. Do you agree with the view that Tehran and Paris are allies regarding Armenia?
— Once again, we can only speak about certain factions because there is a serious process happening within the Iranian elite that is not entirely visible. This process, which began during the protests we’ve heard much about, has led to a deep crisis within a significant portion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and there are numerous questions regarding their handling of security and the distribution of financial resources under their control, including those related to unsanctioned goods exports. Additionally, there have been many instances where IRGC members were found to be in unique relationships with Western intelligence services. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that those shouting “Death to America!” in Iran are also enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).
We must not forget that much of the current political elite in Tehran has its roots in France. This also raises many questions. For France, as I’ve mentioned, Turkey is a geopolitical rival, so they will always use certain anti-Turkish tendencies in Iranian foreign policy. We must clearly understand this.
Therefore, nothing unusual is happening. On the other hand, I believe that there are strong forces within the Iranian political elite that are oriented toward regional cooperation, including with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Political processes are in motion.
