Following the Protocols signed in 2009 to normalise relations between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey took the initiative as of 2010 to implement a holistic cooperative project, which aimed at supporting regional ties in the South Caucasus through economic-commercial means reacting effects on a regional as well as global scale.
After a new war between Armenia and Azerbaijan broke out on September 27, 2020, Russia—which is Armenia’s key ally and has an extensive military presence in the country—maintained a position of relative neutrality, notwithstanding multiple attempts by Yerevan to drag Moscow into the conflict.
The timing of these provocations is no coincidence. In early October, Baku and Yerevan started to use each other’s airspace for civilian flights. Despite the fact that there had been no official ban on these flights before, both sides preferred not to fly over each other’s territories up until now.
Tehran is not happy about Azerbaijan’s victory in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh against Armenia. And Baku’s restrictions on Iranian trucks entering the region escalated tensions between the neighbours.
The Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey along with the Turkish-Azerbaijani Friendship Cooperation and Solidarity Foundation (TADIV) on Sunday commemorated the "martyrs" of the second Karabakh War, also known as the Patriotic War.
After the Sovietization of the South Caucasus, as the process of the unification of the republics within the Transcaucasian Federation went on, their borders were redrawn to bring them into line with the new economic objectives first and foremost.
This paper covers the South Caucasus policy of Turkey after the 44-Day War be- tween Azerbaijan and Armenia in 2020. The aim of the research is to investigate the role of Turkey, which supported Azerbaijan politically and morally in the war, in the South Caucasus. This article concludes that, after this war, a new geopolitical situation has emerged in the South Caucasus region. In this new geopolitics, Turkish soldiers have been deployed, alongside those from Russia, in the Joint Monitoring Centre to observe the ceasefire in the Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Turkey became a kind of guarantor of the liberated Azerbaijani territories through the Shusha Declaration signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Additionally, according to the trilateral statement of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia that was signed on 11 January, it was decided to establish a new corridor that is planned to pass through Armenia to connect Turkey with Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkey–Azerbaijan strategic relations have entered a new phase in terms of economic, military, and defence industry technologies. In short, after the 44-Day War, Turkey gained an advantageous position in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
The delegation of the foreign affairs and inter-parliamentary relations committee of Azerbaijan’s parliament visited the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) for the first time Friday.
War is often an amalgamation of various objectives. One of the core aims of the occupation of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia was the suppression of the identity of the occupied population and territory. Thus, this warfare affected not only people but also the collective narrative of their environments, history, culture, and identity.
The military-political situation in the South Caucasus region became one of the main subjects of discussion during the visit of the acting Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan to Russia. By the way, this is the Armenian leader’s first foreign trip after the recent snap parliamentary elections.
This is an excerpt from the response to Aze.Media’s inquiry about the activities of the State Committee on Work with the Diaspora in 2020, in particular the Committee’s activities addressing
In September–November 2020, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or Azerbaijan’s military operation “Iron Fist”, entered Russian media’s agenda. The aim of this paper is to examine the coverage of this war in the Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta newspapers.
In the information age, the war of words can be very revealing. In this analysis for KarabakhSpace.eu, Yalchin Mammadov looks at what the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders' twitter posts throughout the 44-day war can tell us about how they wanted to portray the conflict to the international community.
On June 15, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Karabakh to meet with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, thus becoming the first foreign leader to visit the region following last year’s 44-day war.
The traditional geopolitical boundaries that have defined the South Caucasus in the post-Cold War era are shifting as the region becomes increasingly connected to the eastern Mediterranean and wider Middle East.
The full text of the Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations, which was signed June 15 by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the city of Shusha, has been published.
According to the data of Narkhozuchet (the national economic accounting agency) and the Ministry of Agriculture of the Armenian SSR, 25,000 Azerbaijani families, or about 110,000 people, lived in Armenia before the resettlement in 1948. Of these, only 9,000 families, or 35,000 people lived in lowland regions, the remaining 75,000 inhabiting mountainous regions of the Armenian SSR.
France's support for Armenia suggests a bias incompatible with the former's position as a Co-Chair of the OSCE's Minsk Group says Vasif Huseynov in this opinion piece for KarabakhSpace.eu. This damages the prospect for peace and security in the South Caucasus, to the detriment of everyone, including the Armenian people.
During the latest round of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which came to an end in November following a Russian-brokered ceasefire, Azerbaijan enjoyed support
After the tragic experience of the Second World War and Nazism, modern civilized society, realizing the seriousness and the ultimate consequences of the abovementioned approach, now avoids “humiliation and superiority” and adheres to a tolerant attitude towards so-called “others.”
Azerbaijan is a nation friendly with NATO member Turkey. Since May 4, 1994, Azerbaijan has cooperated with the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. Trend News Agency reported this cooperation as “extremely effective” for the past 27 years and one day since it was established.
However, in the early years, women still could not fully comprehend the significance of the rights they had gained, and the relics of feudal patriarchal way of life hindered the handling of women's issues in Azerbaijan. Therefore, the issuance of decrees, resolutions and regulations and the adoption of laws did not mean actual gender equality.
Azerbaijanis are the second largest ethnic group in Georgia. Most of the Georgian Azerbaijanis live in the region of Kvemo Kartli (the municipalities of Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Gardabani), and in a small part in Kakheti and Shida Kartli. Azerbaijanis make up 84% of the population in Marneuli, 66% in Dmanisi, and 63% in Bolnisi, and 44% in Gardabani. According to official statistics for 2014, the total of 233,024 Azerbaijanis live in Georgia. 75% of them are Sunni Muslims and 25% are Shiites.
In June, Azerbaijan announced that it was planning to buy Turkish-made armed drones. “Efforts in this direction are continuing. Now we are having results,” said Azerbaijan’s Defense Minister Zakir Hasanov. In the same month, the Azeri parliament approved a bill to receive financial assistance from Turkey to be used for the purchase of weapons systems.